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THE MARXIST 
DILEMMA IN KERALA: 
ADMlINISTRATION 
AND/OR STRUGGLE 
/ Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. 
7lhe political polarization envisioned by some in the wake of the Congress 
split has not materialized. It is clear, nevertheless, that the polar extremes of 
India's political spectrum are becoming more powerful, that the Jana Sangh 
on ithe right and the Marxists on the left have assumed increasing impor- 
tance in India's political ife. Their strength is geographically concentrated 
in different regions-the Jana Sangh in the Hindi heartland; the Marxist 
in West Bengal and Kerala. It is within Kerala that the Marxists have had 
their greatest appeal. Investigations of coalition government in the Indian 
states and where parties of the left have enjoyed wide electoral appeal is of 
increasing importa!nice- two dim,ensionls of party politics in India that have 
received but limited attention. 
Kerala is a land of contradictions in a nation of contrasts. It is a minia- 
ture of India, with all variables pushed to their extremes. As India's smallest 
state, Kerala has ithe highest birthrate and the greatest pressure on the land. 
It 'abounds in agricultural wealth, yet must import half ilts food supply. Its 
international exports bring 25 % of India's dollar earnings, yet Kerala's per 
capita income is the lowest in India. It has the highest literacy rate and the 
highest rate of unemployment. With the largest community of Christians, it 
has the highest Communist vote also. It is at once a bastion of orthodox 
Hinduism, with the most elaborate system (of caste ranking in India and, at 
the same time, a region deeply affected by the process of social mobilization 
and change. With many of the "prerequisites" of political modernization, 
Kerala is regarded by the C!ommunist Party of India (Marxist) -or CPM- 
as an advanced outpost of revolutionary struggle.1 
In 1957, the Communist Party of India formed a ministry under E. M. S. 
Nambolodiiiipad and governed the state for twenty-eight months until a 
masss upsurge" brought central intervention and President's Rule. Ten 
'For a discussion of the political sociology of Kerala, see Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., 
"Caste in Kerala: A Preface to the Elections," Economic Weekly, November 21, 1964, 
pp. 1841-48; and "Caste and the Kerala Elections," Economic Weekly, April 17, 1965, 
pp. 669-72. 
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years later, in 1967, Namboodiripad again formed a Government, is nine 
in a broadly-based, iton-Congress United Front. Although the Communims 
had deepened their hold among Kerala's poorest classes, particularly the 
agricultural laborers, their support remained remarkably stable. Indeed, 
with a -high degree of political iteracy and participation, Kerala reflects a 
salience of party identity rare in India. In the four elections over the last 
decade in Kerala, the Communists have maintained approximately one-third 
of the vote, with fluctuations and a low of some 28% in 1965.2 The Congress9 
like the Communists, has maintained a fairly steady third of the vote, and, 
an anti-Congress alliance could securely isolate it from power. The seven- 
party United Front, with 52% of 'the vote, gained 117 of the 133 Assembly 
seats and 17 of the 18 Parliamentary seats in the 1967 election. Congress 
was reduced ;to 9 seats in the Assembly, despite the support of 35%o of th(e 
electorate. For the second time, E. M. S. Namboodiripad took over as Chief 
Minister of India's "problem state." 
In October 1969, the United Front government collapsed after 31 month iji 
in office-the longest tenure of Kerala's ten ministries and five periods of 
Presidential Rule. Hanging on after the resignation of seven of the twelve 
ministers and the withdrawal of four parties from the coalition government., 
Namboodiripad finally resigned in the face of a majority motion in the As- 
sembly on the issue of corruption. The issue of corruption provided a con' 
venient smoke-screen around which divergent parties, without regard to 
their class character and ideological incompatibility, might rally against the 
Marxists. The vote on the motion, 69-60, formalized what had been the 
deepening division among the constituent parties of the United Front. 
A CPI Member of Parliament, Achutha Menon, placed responsibility for 
the Government's collapse on the big party bossism of the CPM, its cdis- 
ruptive behavior, and sectarian policies. To the surprise of all, in a bid to 
avert President's Rule, Menon succeeded in welding sufficient solidarity 
among the 'heterogeneous parties to form aGovernment-united more in their 
opposition to the Marxists than in the determination to fulfill the promises 
of the 1967 election. But on the basis of this commitment, Menon claimed 
his Government as 'heir successor to the United Front. The "mini-front,"' 
as it was called, in supplanting the anti-Congress United Front became es 
sentially an anti-Marxist front. The new Government coalition, led by the, 
CPI, included the Muslim League, the ISP, and the Kerala Congress, with 
the RSP in support outside the Ministry. Unwilling to test his claim t a 
majority Without Congress support by calling the Assembly into session, 
Menon alluded to support from unnamed defectors from the Marxist camp. 
When they idid not materialize, the Congress split conveniently opened the 
possibility of support from the "progressive" Indira Gandhi faction. 
The Marxists had been thrown out, ostensibly on charges of corruption. 
'For the best discussion of the split and contemporary background of the Commnsasiist 
party, see Mohan Ram, Indian Commnnismn, (Delhi: Vikas, 1969). 
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Ministerial corruption, both for personal enrichment and party aggrandize- 
ment, had been an issue of increasing conmrn. In ithe Marxist view, how- 
e .er, some degrees of corruption, while not sanctioned, are perhaps inevi- 
table-even in the most revolutionary parties-as they struggle in a corrupt 
society, to work in a dialectical process within the system in order to break 
the system.3 Glearly, however, the real issues which brought down the Gov- 
ement were far more serious and lay in the nature of the United Front 
itself. 
The UF had been forged as an electoral alliance of seven parties with a 
minimumnprogram. Although less eclectic than Ram Manohar Lahia's "non- 
Gongressism" (;advocating a front of all opposition parties across the politi- 
cal spectrum to dislodge the Congress), the left-led United Front in Kerala 
came to power with serious internal contradictions. Itwas an electoral front 
with limited programmatic objectives, but the Marxists sought to esablish 
their own hegemony within the Front and to transform itinto an instrument 
of stTuggle. 
The Marxists conceive of the United Front governments in Kerala and 
West Bengal as "instruments of struggle Mi the hands of the people, more 
than as governments that actually possess adequate power, that can ma- 
terially and substantially give relief ;to the people." "In clear class terms," 
the, CPM Central Committee stated in 1967, ",our Party's participation in 
such Governments i one specific form of struggle to win more and more 
people, and more and more allies for the proletariat and its allies in the 
struggle for the cause of People's Democracy and at a later stage for so- 
ciaiism."4 The United Front then is for the Marxists essentially a revolu- 
tionary concept. For the CPI and others, such a stance was "big party 
chauvinism." 
The CPI has made much of a reported speech in London by B. T. Rana. 
dive, a member of the CPM Politburo. The task of the UF Government, he 
reportedly said, was "to unleash discontent" of the people rather an "to 
give relief."5 Achutha Menon, Chief 'Minister of the new mini-front Govern- 
met.,, in reviewing what happened in Kerala, accused the Marxists of a 
"' wrong, and sectarian approach." "Of course," he wrote, "the power and 
resources of a state government functioning under our constitution are 
limited and we should certainly not be a party to foster unwarranted illu. 
sions among the people that everything they desire will be done for them. 
But within all these limitations, it is possible to give some relief to our much 
suffering people and give them a better administration than the Congress 
hald given."6 The Marxists were alleged to have used the police and the ad- 
interview with Mathew Kurian, Trivandrum, January 1970. Also see M. Basavapun- 
naiai in People's Democracy, Oct. 19, 1969, p. 7. 
4New Situation and Party's Tasks, Calcutta: Communist Party of India (Marxist), 
1967, p. 70. 
'Indian Express, June 22, 1969. 
lkhst Happened in Kerala, New Delhi: Communist Party of India, 1969, p. 2. 
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ministrative machinery Iof the state government 'as an, adjunct of the party, 
their efforts being directed mainly against the 'CPI. They were also accused 
of interfering with the administrative spheres under the control of other 
parties, notably agriculture and industry, under CP'I ministers. At the same 
time, withinthe areas of their own administrative responsibility, the Marx- 
ists failed to provide any effective relief to the people-as in their handling 
of the food procurement program and in the two year delay in passage of 
the land reform act. The Marxists thus were charged with seeking to advance 
their own position at the expense of allied parties within the United Front on 
the one hand and with failure to implement the minimum program on the 
other. 
The Namboodiri'pad-government 'did indeed emerge with a relatively low 
performance record on a number of accounts, but ironically its failure to 
implement more of the minimum program wasi due in considerable measure 
to caution. In choosing to work within the system, 'they were inevitably 
limited by it, conditioned by "the possible" in the system's terms. Indeed, 
some six months 'after 'the UF government came to power in 1967, the Cen- 
tral Committee of the CPM was 'highly critical of the Marxist leadership in 
Kerala for its failure to "'independently mobilize the people" and for put- 
ting forward "only such proposals as are likely to be immediately accepted 
by 'other partners."7 A year later, the Central Committee again took note of 
the "serious shortcomings" ,of the Kerala leadership. It warned of the dan- 
gers inherent in the type of parliamentary struggle engaged in and of the 
"reformist and constitutional illusions it breeds."8 
While the CPI attacked the Marxists fo'r failure "to give relief," the 
"Naxalite" groups in Kerala, adhering ;to a Maoist line of revolutionary 
struggle, attacked the Marxists for their revisionist concern for incremental 
reform. Efforts to provide surplus land to the landless, is regarded by the 
Naxalites, for example, 'as involving a danger of "en-bourgeoisficiation," 
,thus creating a class of small peasants with little revolutionary potential. The 
Marxists, as Lenin earlier had done, reject the a-rgument hat only through 
intensification of poverty can a revolutionary situation emerge, i.e., the 
worse it is, the better it is. In rejecting the left 'sectarian thesis, however, 
the Marxists 'have not really ,answered the problem. There are indeed serious 
risks in 'a program 'of land reform when there is simply not enough land 
for 'those to whom it has been promised, 'when the only viable economic 
answer in Marxist terms, is not land-to-the-tiller, but collectivization. 
The Naxalite gr'o'ups in Kerala have received wide publicity and 'have 
aroused much 'concern.9 With its leadership jailed or dead, the movement 
-never really larger than some 4,000 activists-has been severely setback. 
'Central Committee Resolutions, adopted at Madurai, August 18 to 27, 1967, p. 33. 
8Political-Organizational Report, Central Committee of the 8th Congress of the CPI 
(M), Cochin, December 23-29, 1968, Calcutta: CPI (M), 1969, p. 177. 
9See Marcus F. Franda's analysis of the Maoist groups in India in "India's Third 
Communist Party," Asian Survey, IX:12, December 1969, pp. 797-817. 
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There iare now some six distinct groups: an ineffectual, largely verbal CPI 
(Marxist-Leninist) group, centered among the Trivandrum employees of 
the Indian Life Insurance Corporation; the Communist Revolutionary Party 
and its splinter, both led by .defectors from the CPM; the "Kosalramdas 
groups," another Marxist offshoot with a limited ,trade union following; the 
Kunnikalites, the group which led the abortive raids in North Wynaid in 
late 1968; land 'a Kunnikalite faction, nurtured by the conviction that their 
leader, Kunnikal Nairayan, betrayed the revolution by surrendering to the 
police. Beyond the handful of Naxalites, however, there exists within the 
Marxist party considerable sympathy for the extremist position and a feel- 
ing of general unease with parliamentary-or at least governmental-par- 
ticipation. 
Criticized by the CPM Central Committee and increasingly sensitive to 
the attack from the left-4oth within the Kerala Marxist party and from the 
Naxalite'splinter groups-the CPM assumed a more aggressive stance with.- 
in the UF, particularly after the Marxist success in the West Bengal mid- 
term elections and perception. of expanding power on the part of coalition 
partners. This 'was most apparent in -the case of the Mu-slim League. The 
League had, to 'begin with, come into the United Front under very favorable 
conditions. With 'a geographic stronghold, they elected 14 iof their 15 can- 
didates. Four of ;the eleven UF ministers were Muslim, 'although Muslims 
form only 18 per cent of the population 'of Kerala. Under the UF Government, 
the League won recognition for Muslim private sohiools, a Muslim majority 
district was created in Malabar, middle-class positions opened in the bu- 
reaucracy to Muslims, and a Muslim was appointed to the High Court. With 
the electorate of the Malabar region divided in a three-way split between 
Congress, the Muslim League, and the Marxists, the League holds the 'bal- 
ance. In courting it, however, the Marxists. had contributed to 'the League's 
enhanced status among all Muslims, thus threatening the Marxist hold 
among the poor Muslim peasantry and agricultural labor. The benefits se- 
cured byfthe League were in fact largely for the middle.~class -and the Le'ague 
leadership remained, as before, in the hands of a wealthy mercantile class. 
The League had, however, received 'a new respectability: its communal and 
feud-al character had been soft-pedaled by the Marxists themselves. The 
Marxists eventually felt it imperative to recoup, their position among the 
landless laborers 'of the Muslim community. The League in. consequence be- 
came immediately defensive. 
The CPI seemed to' be -the other beneficilary of the United Front Govern- 
ment. The split in 1964 had left the CPI with little more than its. leadership, 
a hold on the trade union movement, land a, pocket 'of support among the 
cashew workers, of Quilon District. Using the industry and agriculture port- 
folio's the CPI soulgpht o advance its position. Its policies, appealing to the 
middle peasant and the ulrbian middle-class, came into direct conflict with 
the Marxist position from the beginning. Within. the early months of the 
ministry, the CIPI had 'already begun -the maneuvers which were to culminate 
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in the isolation of the Marxists in the coalition. The CPM reacted "from 
below" in more aggressive trade union activity, cutting at the already mini- 
mal base of CPI support through the creation of parallel and competitive 
unions in some cases, or, in others, complete capture of the unions from 
within. "From above," the Marxists treated the CPI as the "main enemy" 
within the UF Government and sought to undercut its ministerial position. 
If the Marxist attitude toward its coalition partners became more "big 
brotherly," however, the fear of losing office through central intervention 
led, for all the talk of confrontation with the Center, to ensnarlement inthe 
bureaucratic imbroglio so much despised by the Marxists. Their experience 
did indeed demonstrate the difficulties of managing a coalition in a state 
government under the Indian constitution, but this made little impression 
on the people. And with their ignominious departure the Marxists lost the 
potential benefits of being cast from office because they had acted in the 
name of the people. Had the Marxists, once in power, simply begun to im- 
plement radical land reform measures, for example, rather than to placate 
their coalition partners and wait interminably for Presidental approval, the 
Government might well have been forced to resign, but the political capital 
accrued would have been enormous. Ranadive perhaps was suggesting such 
a tactic when he urged Marxist ministers "to press ahead with legislations 
which were likely to be vetoed by the center or the High Court. Such con- 
frontations," he continued "were designed to tell masses of the impossibility 
of carrying through fundamental reforms under the present constitution."10 
The Marxists under the UF Government sought to combine administra- 
tion and struggle, popular initiative plus utilization of the administrative 
machinery for the advancement of the "basic classes." The CPI, on the other 
hand, sought "efficient administration." M. N. Govindan Nair, the CPI 
leader and Agriculture Minister under the UF, denounced the Marxist 
strategy: "Administration a d struggle cannot go together: either give up 
administration a d continue the struggle or give up the struggle and carry 
on the administration."" 
For all its administrative failures, however, the Marxist Government had 
not been without achievements. Itwas argued that whatever possible relief 
should be given, but that given "the extremely limited and curtailed powers 
and resources of the state Governments," only meager ameliorative relief 
measures could be provided. It was argued that "the devastating effects of 
the deepening economic risis . . . can only be redressed by a radical and 
revolutionary change in the entire social setup."'2 With little potential for 
immediate conomic growth and dependent almost wholly on the Center for 
financial support, politics in Kerala approaches the character -of a zero sum 
:tIlndian Express, June 22, 1969. 
"Quoted by E. M. S. Namboodiripad in Right Communist Betrayal of Kerala U.F. merd 
Government, Calcutta: CPI (M), 1969, p. 7. 
"Political Organizational Report, op. cit., p. 173. 
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game. The Marxists' achievements came at the expense of other parties; the 
relief of certain classes at the expense of others. 
With limited resources, the Marxists relied more on symbolic output han 
on a redistribution of wealth. The Marxist police policy is a case in point. 
The Kerala Home Ministry specified as it did under the Communist Govern- 
ment in 1957, that the police should not interfere in mass struggles except 
when there was an actual outbreak of violence. The police, as an instrument 
of the State, would no longer be used against the people for the protection 
of vested interests. The gherao, coercive encirclement for "quick justice," 
was accepted as a form of peaceful demonstration and therefore as legit- 
imate. The policy was attacked, however, as being selectively enforced so as 
to advance Marxist struggles. Local police were alleged to be willing to act 
only on the express instruction of Marxist cadre. The perceived threat to 
the propertied classes was equated with a "breakdown of law and order." 
Like the mass upsurge of ten years before, the situation was highly colored 
by class perspective. 
0. P. Sangal has noted that: 
The very fact of the CPM emerging as the dominant political force in 
the State changed the psychology of the overwhelming majority of the 
downtrodden a d oppressed masses. They felt as if they had themselves 
come into power. And this feeling was strengthened bytheir everyday 
experience. For example, without any legislative or executive action on 
the part of the government, the wages of agricultural workers increased 
far above the normal market rate just because of the changed political 
atmosphere inthe state. It became possible for ordinary workers and 
peasant leaders to get any oppressive government official transferred 
from his favorite area of operation. 
"The greatest mistake that the CPI appears to have committed in Kerala," 
Sangal argued: 
is its failure to make an objective assessment of the CPM's strength, its 
mass base and its place in the political ife of the State. If the CPI 
leaders were not suffering from gross subjectivism, they would have 
seen that he CPM had become the chief vehicle and the main organiza- 
tional expression of the communist movement inKerala. Whatever mis- 
takes the CPM might have committed inthe past or may commit in the 
future, the CPI can never hope to replace it.13 
During the period of "administration and struggle," the Marxists ought 
to extend their social base-particularly among agricultural labor. The re- 
action of the other parties in the UF was accelerated by the events within 
the Congress. The Congress plit provided the ideological escape, for in the 
conception of the Indian situation held by the CPI, collaboration with "pro- 
"3The Citizen, November 8, 1969, p. 24. 
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gressive" elements of the Congress is possible. Herein lies the narrow, yet 
crucial ideological distinction, between National Democracy, as held by the 
CPI, and People's Democracy, as held by the CPM. Both are regarded as 
transitional stages to socialism and involve the same class alliances-a coali- 
tion of the anti-feudal, anti-imperialist, and anti-monopoly classes. People's 
Democracy, however, presupposes the hegemony of the working class, and 
such hegemony is only to be achieved by protracted struggle. 
The Marxist assessment !of the character of the Indian State is specified 
in the party program: "The present Indian state is the organ of the class 
rule of the bourgeoisie and landlord, led by the big bourgeoisie, who are 
increasingly collaborating with foreign finance capital in pursuit of the 
capitalist path of development."'4 The CPI denies that the Indian leadership 
is dominated by the monopoly bourgeoisie: "The State of India is the organ 
of the class rule of the national bourgeoisie as a whole, in which the big 
bourgeoisie holds powerful influence. This class has strong links with the 
landlords. These factors give rise to reactionary pulls on the State power."'5 
The CPI takes the Congress split as opening "a new stage in the differentia- 
tion between the representatives of the monopoly and non-monopoly strata 
of the bourgeoisie in the Congress" and "a new alignment of political forces 
in the country."'6 
The various Maoist groups share the basic assessment of the CPI (Marx- 
ist-Leninist): "The Congress Government represents the interests of the 
Indian feudal princes, big landlords and bureaucratic-comprador capital- 
ists."117 There are no contradictions within the enemy camp, and the bour- 
geoisie in its entirety must be fought together. The Marxists regard the 
Naxalite position as politically unrealistic, a form of political expressionism 
best characterized by Lenin's diagnosis, "an infantile disorder." However, 
romantic the appeal of instant revolution, India is not at this stage in a 
revolutionary situation. The organization and consciousness of the working 
class remains "at la pitiably low level."'8 
This is felt to be the case since, "despite the intensifying economic-politi- 
cal crisis and the sharpening of class contradictions and the class struggle, 
moving the masses into action on an ever-increasing scale, the political crisis 
is far from maturing into a revolutionary crisis or ripening into a revolu- 
tionary situation."'9 A raid on a police station or the assassination of a 
landlord may reap psychic benefits to those engaged in such furtive efforts, 
but they cannot substitute for political organization and protracted conflict 
"Programme, Calcutta: CPI (M), 1964, p. 25. 
1""Programme of the Communist Party of India," in Documents Adopted by the 
Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of India, Patna, February 7-15, 1968, p. 297. 
"Mohit Sen, "Differentiation Within the Indian Bourgeoisie," Mainstream, Decem- 
ber 13, 1969, p. 28. 
"Quoted from the CPI (M-L) program by E. M. S. Namboodiripad in an interview 
in The Radical Review (Madras) Vol. 1, No. 2 (January 1970), 17. 
"8Present Political Situation, Report adopted by the Central Committee of the CPI 
(M)I Calcutta, February 2.7, 1970, Calcutta: CPI (M), 1970, p. 19. 
"'Ibid., p. 25. 
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guided by a sense of what can in fact be achieved. Going back to Lenin, 
Mathew Kurian, Marxist theorist and economist, argues that extremism is 
another form of opportunism. "Both revisionism and extremism are two 
forms of expression of the same middle-class, petty bourgeois vascillation."20 
In the path between the "revisionism" of the CPI and the "left sectarian- 
ism" of the CPI(M-L), the Marxists have been willing to align with the 
non-monopoly bourgeoisie for tactical purposes "in the interests of the big- 
ger battle." They regard the contradictions within the Indian bourgeoisie as 
real and seek to fully exploit them. Indeed, even the Indian monopoly 
bourgeoisie may come in conflict with foreign monopolists, and in such in- 
stances the Marxists are prepared to cooperate with the class enemy in anti- 
imperialist struggle. The Marxists, however, have regarded the CPI's stance 
as being one of subservience to the national bourgeoisie, and their quarrel 
with the CPI, intensified by the internal conflicts of the UF governments, 
blinded the Marxists to the deepening strains within the Congress. After the 
Congress split in February 1970, the Central Committee of the CPM ad- 
mitted underestimating "the inner contradictions in the Congress combine." 
In "utilizing the two UF state Governments of Kerala and West Bengal as 
the advanced outposts of the democratic revolutionary movement for un- 
leashing big class and mass forces . . . we were, for the most part emphasis- 
ing the intensification ofthe class and social contradictions and the con- 
sequent sharpening of the class struggle in the country and tended to 
underestimate he political impact of the differences and split on the ruling 
Congress party and Government."'21 
In seeking to combine administration and struggle, the Marxists have 
been unwilling to abandon the opportunities afforded by electoral democ- 
racy for the isolation of the underground, although they remain prepared 
to do so in the face of serious attempts to outlaw the party or to force it into 
political isolation. "Elections," says P. Govinda Pillai, editor of the Marxist 
Malayalam daily, "are a means to reach and mobilize large numbers of 
people."22 The political campaign becomes a vehicle of the party's expand- 
ing social base. It reaches potential allies which violence and terrorism 
would only alienate and repel. While "the ruling classes allow the luxury of 
parliamentary !democracy only so long as their own class interests are not 
threatened, Nambooldiripad, inso far as possible, would use the constitution 
as "an instrument of struggle."'23 "Our party is of the view that, so long as 
this system continues, it is in the interest of the working class . . . to so 
20Interview, Trivandrum, January 1970. 
2"Present Political Situation, Report adopted by the Central Committee of the CPI 
(M) Calcutta, February 2-7, 1970, Calcutta: CPI (M), 1970, p. 21. 
22Interview, Cochin. December 1969. 
23The Republican Constitution in the Struggle for Socialism, R. R. Kale Memorial 
Lecture, Poona: Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, 1968, p. 1. In this im- 
portant statement, E.M.S. spells out the Marxist stance in relation to the constitution 
and introduces a program for overhauling the state structure, with the "widest autonomy 
for the various states." pp. 16-20. 
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utilize the institutions a built up on the basis (of this Constitution as to fur- 
ther consolidate and strengthen the struggles of the working people for basic 
social transformations."24 
"Any political party," Kurian states, "however revolutionary, ifit under- 
stands real politics functioning within the bourgeois system, must play the 
game of the system, but though sometimes compromise may be necessary, 
a revolutionary party cannot build its program on bourgeois methods like 
horse-trading."25 Thus, in addition to and inseparable from parliamentary 
tactics, the Marxists insist upon the necessity of extra-parliamentary forms 
of struggle. Success is the criterion by which tactics are to be judged. "The 
only criterion on which Marxism-Leninism bases itself when it selects a 
particular method for bringing about social transformations," according to 
Namboodiripad, "is whether it will serve the purpose." He does not reject or 
extol any particular form of strategy, violent or nonviolent, but he notes, 
"the form depends on the mood of the people, their sentiments, their unity 
and cohesion."26 
The militant posture assumed by the Marxists immediately after the mini- 
front came to power served to cement what would have been an almost im- 
mediately unstable coalition. As it was, even the right wing Kerala Congress 
went along with the land reform implementation. Frustration seemed more 
to dictate the Marxist tactic than a sensitivity to the situation. On all sides, 
however, it was admitted that the CPM had not lost any iof its own support. 
The Marxists hold the allegiance of the increasingly conscious and militant 
landless laborers, but their activities 'have alienated them from the broader 
base of support required to secure an absolute majority in an election.27 
The September 1970 elections in Kerala would seem to confirm this per- 
spective and to underscore the basic stability of electoral behavior in the 
state. While the results are not yet fully available as this journal goes to 
press, the Marxists, though reduced from 49 to 30 seats in the Assembly, 
retained the 23.5% of the vote they had captured in 1967. Even without add- 
ing the votes of the three Marxist-supported independents, who have since 
joined the party, the CPM emerges as the largest political party in Kerala, 
a position previously enjoyed by the undivided Congress. 
The call for elections had come as a surprise. The contradictions within 
the mini-front Government were becoming increasingly evident with the de- 
mands for an expanded ministry. Buoyed by confidence of his own success, 
Chief Minister Achutha Menon dissolved the Assembly in June and called for 
fresh elections in the early Fall. The move was designed to strengthen the 
position of the CPI as well as to secure a decisive majority for the Govern- 
ment. Under the impending strain of demands for the apportionment of 
seats, the tensions within the mini-front deepened. The Kerala Congress and 
"Ibid., p. 3. 
"Interview, Trivandrum, January, 1970. 
2"Ibid. 
interviewew ith K. P. Karunakaran, Trivandrunm, January 1970. 
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the ISP withdrew, and an opposition "Democratic Front" was formed with 
an alliance between the Kerala Congress and the organization Congress, in 
electoral adjustment with the ISP, the Jana Sangh, and the Kerala Karshaka 
Party. The Marxist bloc remained intact, with the SSP, KTP, and KSP. The 
incumbent mini-front, composed of the CPI, the Muslim League, and the 
RSP, added the Praja Socialist Party and, most significantly, entered into 
and "understanding" with Indira Gandhi's "new" Congress. 
The three front election, attracting visits by national party leaders, in- 
cluding Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, brought roughly a 70% turnout. The 
election captured national headlines with the dramatic showing of the new 
Congress, portending the possibility of general elections in February 1971. 
After virtual eclipse in the Assembly, the Congress was again a force of 
considerable power, with 32 seats instead of its previous 5. Although choos- 
ing to remain outside the Government, the Congress provides Achutha Menon 
with the secure majority he sought. The new Congress received 19.2% of the 
vote, a decline from that secured by the undivided Congress in 1967, but 
the votes still held by the old Congress were insufficient to gain it even one 
seat in the Assembly. The victories of the new Congress bring into Kerala 
politics a powerful influence of youth, for much of the energy behind the 
party arises from the pro-Indira Gandhi Youth Congress and from the Con- 
gress-affiliated Kerala Student Union, which controls ome 70% of the col- 
lege unions in the state.28 
The Congress victory was clearly not the triumph over the Marxists pro- 
claimed so widely in the Indian press. The Marxists had, in fact, not only 
held their own in the percentage of votes, but with the inclusion of the in- 
dependents, had actually augmented their position. The impressive Congress 
victories-as their defeats in 1967-were fundamentally the product of front 
tactics. This is especially clear in Malabar, where the Marxists suffered 
severe losses at the hands of the Congress because 'of the latter's understand- 
ing with the Muslim League. But the heralded defeat of the Marxist can- 
didates did not apparently cut into their percentage of the votes. 
The elections revealed the weakness of the Naxalites. All six of the "rev- 
olutionary communists" who contested the elections lost their deposits. The 
Marxists, however, have moved vigorously since their ouster in 1969 to es- 
tablish their own militant credentials. Struggle was the dominant heme of 
their campaign, and they are unlikely to set it aside in electoral defeat. The 
Marxists have retained their base of support among the poor and landless 
of Kerala, and, with time, it is likely to expand. Under such circumstances, 
their reduction of seats and isolation in the Assembly may well serve as a 
catalyst o increasing militancy and the road of revolution. 
2BThe Hindustan Times, September 26, 1970. 
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